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I. INTRODUCTION
The most fundamental question in free speech law is not whether to
protect the speech in question, either as a matter of absolute principle' or
through some judicial test.2  More fundamental is whether "speech," for
purposes of the First Amendment, is even present. Not everything
imaginable counts as speech in the relevant constitutional sense. If freedom
of speech has particular purposes and goals, the idea of speech must have
some bounds and limits. Speech for First Amendment purposes cannot
include everything. One can be a free speech absolutist, certainly, only if
not everything counts as speech.
So, we must distinguish two problems in every free speech case. The
first and most fundamental problem, and the focus of our attention here, is
always one of the scope,4 range, or boundaries of what counts as speech for
First Amendment purposes. Only if we decide that the case presents speech
in the relevant sense, must we then face the second and more familiar
problem. The second problem is the proper degree or stringency of the
constitutional protection to be accorded,' or of the structure of that
constitutional protection.
If we decide that speech is involved in the first place, we can then
choose the degree of stringency and structure of the First Amendment
protection we consider appropriate. Often this latter choice will involve the
1. See, e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 867 (1960).
2. Among the expanding variety of increasingly sophisticated judicial free speech tests, see,
e.g., Morse v. Frederick 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (certain forms of public school student speech);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (public employee speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973) (certain forms of pornography); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(libel of public officials).
3. As recognized in Black, supra note 1, and illustrated in Cohen v. Calfornia, 403 U.S. 15, 27
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Cohen's anti-draft jacket writing as an "absurd and immature
antic" amounting, crucially, to "mainly conduct and little speech"). More moderately, even if we
like the idea of deciding close free speech cases in favor of the speaker, in order to better insulate
"core" speech, it does not follow that we should include as much as possible, however trivial, in the
category of "speech" for free speech purposes.
4. The basic terminology for this distinction was popularized in FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89 (1982).
5. See id.
6. Consider, for example, the refinement in the structuring of free speech protection in the libel
context. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public
figure plaintiffs); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (limits on actual malice
requirement for private figure plaintiffs); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion) (refining Gertz in case of speech not on matters of public interest
and concern); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (burden of proof on issue of
falsity).
1218
[Vol. 37: 1217, 2010] What Counts as Speech in the First Place?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
balancing of the free speech interests with the other, perhaps conflicting,
interests at stake.
But the difficult and complex prior question is that of the scope of what
should count as speech at all, for First Amendment purposes. As we shall
see, we cannot evade this question without paying a substantial price. To
merely assume for the sake of argument that the purported speech in
question counts as speech, and then leave that merely assumed speech in the
end constitutionally unprotected, often involves unnecessary costs. There
will turn out to be practical value in making progress on what should count
as speech in the first place.
As to our crucial question of how best to define the scope of speech, and
to decide what counts as speech in particular cases, we shall eventually
conclude that no simple approach will suffice. A multi-factored, multi-
layered, interrelated approach, however untidy, is inescapably necessary. As
our concluding section will concisely highlight, in deciding on what counts
as speech, we must take interactive account of the constitutional text;
originalism in constitutional meaning; functionalism in interpretation; the
theory of symbolism and pre-symbolism; the roles of basic free speech
values, general rules, mid-level "heuristics," and specific contexts and
circumstances; theories of meaning, ambiguity, and vagueness; as well as
Supreme Court precedents, on their own and as applied.9 No tidy solution is
possible. No simple formula will do.
Making such progress in understanding speech in terms of the vital area
of free speech law is plainly important. However, another intriguing
application of how we come to our understanding exists beyond that which
we can explore here; any progress we make in clarifying what should count
as speech for First Amendment purposes may have a carry-over value into
other areas of the law as well. A number of other important problems in the
law may be approachable with analogous techniques reaching similar
results.
For example, within the scope of the Bill of Rights, one immediately
notes a number of potentially crucial terms that, like speech, are not defined
within the Constitution. Can we have, for example, a satisfactory theory of
the freedom of the press without a theory of what the "press" amounts to? 0
7. See the public employee speech case of Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), for
merely one example of an explicit weighing of various conflicting interests in a free speech context.
8. See infra Parts V, XII, & XIII.
9. See infra Part XIII for a concise accounting of these considerations.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. We could, in principle, simply decide every free press case as a
free speech case. Courts have sometimes gestured in such a direction. See, e.g., David A. Anderson,
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In addition, the Constitution itself does not help us with the problem of what
should count as "religion"" or as an "establishment" thereof.12 Nor does the
text offer much guidance as to the scope and bounds of "arms,,"13 a
"search," 4 a "seizure," 5 a "taking," 6 or an instance of "punishment"' 7
under the Bill of Rights.
If we can develop a workable approach to a better theory of what should
count as speech for First Amendment purposes, we may be able to transfer
these techniques, appropriately adapted, to those and other contexts. But
first, we must develop such an approach in the already crucially important
free speech context. And this will inevitably involve a multi-faceted,
mutually interactive, multi-layered approach.
The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 456 (1983) (noting "the terms freedom of
speech and freedom of press have been used more or less interchangeably" with no more expansive
rights typically accorded under the latter formula). But if we follow that route, we just add to the
importance of arriving at our best possible view of what should count as "speech."
11. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579; Eduardo Peilalver, Note, The Concept ofReligion, 107 YALE L.J. 791 (1997).
12. Of course, the Establishment Clause is often read to prohibit more than literal establishment
of a state religion; activities tending in such a direction may be prohibited as well. See, e.g., Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); id. at 609, 620 (Souter, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 678 (1984). But again, our ability to decide what might be, or what tends toward, an
establishment of religion will often depend on our underlying view of what constitutes
"establishment" in the first place.
13. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791-92 (2008), for a recent discussion
noting several controversies even in this relatively concrete area.
14. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REV. 541 (1988); Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 14; see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a
Definition of a Seizure: What Is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619 (1990); Susan M. Kuzma, Seizures Under the Fourth
Amendment: Let's Cut to the Chase, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 289 (1991) ("Defining the term
'seizure' has proved difficult . . . .").
16. For an example providing a sense of the complexity of recognizing a constitutional "taking,"
see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 534 U.S. 1063
(2001). See also Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part
11-Takings As Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV.
53, 56 (1990) ("[T]he more effort the Court has devoted to the issue, the more confused and complex
its takings doctrine has become." (citing Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1299 (1989))).
17. See, e.g., Maria Foscarinis, Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1667-68 (1980); Thomas K. Landry, "Punishment" and the Eighth
Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1607, 1610 (1996) (noting that "modem Eighth Amendment discourse
has consisted of a competition among three flawed definitions of punishment"). For merely one
contemporary punishment issue, see United States v. Lawrence, 548 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir.
2008) (Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act as "nonpunitive in its purpose").
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II. STARTING AT THE BEGINNING: THE LIMITED ROLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
The most obvious routes to defining "speech" are largely but not
entirely unavailing. The authoritative text of the First Amendment itself is
of limited help. The text refers to speech, and more fully to "the freedom of
speech,"' 8 perhaps in some vague institutional sense,19 but does not delimit
what should or should not count as speech. The text offers here no
preamble, as in the Second Amendment's "well-regulated militia"20 preface,
to provide possible guidance.2'
But suppose we venture beyond the bare text of the First Amendment, in
search of some determinate and binding intent of the framers and ratifiers of
the Free Speech Clause. Can we ascertain much in the way of an "original
meaning" or "original intent," fixing for us the scope and bounds of what
should count as speech?
As it turns out, even if we set aside the problems with originalism in
general,22 originalist methods in our context are of little help. Consider, to
begin with, the judgment of Professor Stanley C. Brubaker: "The debates in
Congress concerning the speech and press clauses shed scant light on the
question of meaning.... Nor do we find enlightening comments in the state
legislatures that considered the amendments or the local newspapers or
pamphlets of the time."23 One of the quintessential framers, Alexander
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. The article "the" may suggest a view of "the freedom of speech" as a sort of abstract legal
and political institution, formal or informal. But even if so, this leaves the nature and boundaries of
that institution hopelessly underdetermined. The humble initial article "the" is emphasized in Mark
P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156 (1986) and in John
Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1296 (1993).
20. See, U.S. CONST. amend. II.
21. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), discussing the Second
Amendment's preface.
22. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1997); Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the
Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Five
Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311 (1996). For a lively debate, see ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) and the commentaries published
therein. See also R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 687 (2008).
23. Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 82, 85 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed.,
1991); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 907, 917 (1992) ("We do not know how the Framers felt about each of the categories of speech
which courts have exempted from protection.").
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Hamilton, seems even more deeply skeptical: "What is the liberty of the
press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost
latitude for evasion?" 24
When an illustrious, near-contemporary framer, Justice Joseph Story,
begins to address questions of the scope of First Amendment speech, his
attention quickly turns to matters of the structure or nature of the protection
accorded to speech. Thus, Justice Story holds that
the language of this amendment imports no more, than that every
man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon
any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always, that
he does not injure any other person in his rights, person, property, or
reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby disturb the
public peace, or attempt to subvert the government.25
It seems possible to argue that the references here to "opinions" and to a
"subject" of speech might suggest a limitation on what should count as
speech. Does all the entertaining instrumental music we recognize as First
Amendment speech today 26 express an opinion or have a "subject"? Does
"opinion" encompass all statements of politically relevant fact? Or we
might ask, if only half-seriously, whether silence or wearing a black protest
armband counts as speaking, writing, or printing. 27 Justice Story's attention,
above, is almost immediately drawn towards further questions of the
structure of protection, as in his reference to prior restraint of speech,28 and
to various forms of injurious or subversive political speech.29 In general,
focusing on the constitutional text or the quest for original meaning of
speech offers us at best only limited progress.
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
25. JOSEPH STORY WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 704 (Carolina Academic Press
1987) (1833).
26. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995) (referencing the music of Arnold Schoenberg). Actually, some but probably not all, of
Schoenberg's compositions can be said to have a subject in a standard sense. See also Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989); Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 259-60 (4th
Cir. 2005).
27. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For
some possible meanings of deliberate silence in particular contexts, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992).
28. See STORY, supra note 25, at 704.
29. See id.
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III. PROFESSOR SCHAUER'S FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH
AND ITS APPLICATION
The Framers thus offer us, whether we are inclined to accept it or not,
only modest guidance on issues of the scope and bounds of speech for First
Amendment purposes.30 But we can still make progress by adding in
various other means, singly or in combination. Professor Schauer usefully
points out that we will never find a set of words that are both a precise
equivalent to the meaning of "speech" in our sense, and also easy to apply
judicially. Instead, Professor Schauer refers to speech as a "functional
term." 32  More clearly, we can certainly see freedom of speech as a
functional idea. As noted below,33 freedom of speech is recognized for
several purposive reasons. Protecting speech at a constitutional level is
intended to promote these reasonably well-recognized purposes or values.34
Functionalism should indirectly help us set the boundaries for what counts as
speech for First Amendment purposes.
However, Professor Schauer inadvertently illustrates the difficulty of
this boundary-setting process. Immediately, Professor Schauer argues that
"[c]onspiracy, perjury, fraud and extortion ... are all 'speech' in the
ordinary sense, yet are not 'speech' under any conception of freedom of
speech."35 If any clarification is needed, Professor Schauer then specifies
that "[i]t is not that regulation of such acts meets the heightened burden of
justification implicit in the Free Speech Principle. Rather, such acts are not
within the scope of the Principle at all."36
We can certainly see the logic of Professor Schauer's position here.
Whatever the special purposes, values, or functions of protecting speech tum
out to be, it is unlikely that they will be significantly implicated in the
30. Somewhat more broadly, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 28
(1992) (noting some of the difficulties in ascertaining original intent regarding almost any First
Amendment interpretive question); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).
31. See SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 91.
32. Id.
33. See infra Part VI.
34. See id
35. SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 92. For further, recent discussion of some categories of "literal"
speech excluded from "speech" for First Amendment purposes, see IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550
F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting in the end that "the matter remains a doctrinal mystery").
36. SCHAUER, supra note 4 at 92. For an intriguing discussion, though not entirely free from
confusion, see the "Hit Man" civil-aiding book case of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d
233, 244-45 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing, e.g., illegal drug recipe books, explosives cookbooks and
tax fraud seminars), along with the perceptive analysis in KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND
THE USES OF LANGUAGE 85-87 (1989).
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typicaln case of a written bank robbery hold-up note, with instructions
relating to old, unmarked tens and twenties. Or, we could say that just as
such a note (supposedly and significantly) implicates one or more of the
basic purposes of the Free Speech Clause, so does nearly every other
intentional public act-each of which threatening to render the scope of the
Free Speech Clause remarkably and pointlessly broad.
Still, we cannot help but think that context and circumstance may
sometimes make a significant difference. Suppose, for example, that
Cassius and Brutus meet and talk, and that their talk amounts to a criminal
conspiracy against Caesar.38 It may help (to the prejudice of the play) if
their lines are more heavily-laden with continuing, overt, and explicit
political themes such as legitimacy, abuse of legal authority, and thejustification of tyrannicide couched in general and theoretical terms. At
some point, we must ask why their discussion favoring tyrannicide does not
count as political speech when a directly contrary or rebuttal speech at the
same level of generality that opposes tyrannicide would count as political
speech. 9
So, instead of immediately adopting Professor Schauer's category of
absolutism-i.e., criminal conspiracies simply do not count as speech for
First Amendment purposes-we might, in the alternative, bear in mind the
basic functions or purposes of protecting speech, while recognizing some
appropriate role for context and circumstance.40 In the Cassius and Brutus
example above,4 1 it seems natural to say that some, if not all, of what the
Caesarian conspirators say amounts to political speech for First Amendment
purposes, but that on the basis of whatever judicial test we then care to
impose, the conspirators may still be criminally sanctioned. On a
37. It seems arguable that Robin Hood's interdiction of Prince John's ransom shipment through
Sherwood Forest involved political speech for First Amendment purposes. This is not to argue that
Robin's theft, itself, amounted to an act of political speech, but that political speech was an
important component of the overall act. See THE ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD (Warner Bros.
1938).
38. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JuLius CAESAR act 1, sc. 2.
39. For a broad understanding of an "act of expression," including "some bombings,
assassinations, and self-immolations," see Alan Haworth's discussion in ALAN HAWORTH, FREE
SPEECH 8 (1998) (quoting Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204, 206 (1972)).
40. Professor Schauer himself has more recently argued:
Legal doctrine and free speech theory may explain what is protected within the First
Amendment's boundaries, but the location of the boundaries themselves-the threshold
determination of what is a First Amendment case and what is not-is less a doctrinal
matter than a political, economic, social, and cultural one.
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2004). Actually, in this area the distinction
between legal doctrine and considerations of politics, economics, society, and culture is hardly clear.
41. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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functionalist approach, context and circumstance must limit absolutist or
categorical rules as to what can count as speech.
IV. SYMBOLISM, PRE-SYMBOLISM, AND FIRST AMENDMENT "SPEECH"
Perhaps we can simplify the scope-of-speech problem by addressing it
from another angle. Some arguable borderline speech cases, including the
well-known O'Brien draft card burning case,42 are thought of as "symbolic
speech" cases. However, the distinction between symbolic speech and non-
symbolic speech might in and of itself be misleading. Professor Larry
Alexander has argued that "[a]ll speech employs symbols, whether they be
sounds, shapes, gestures, pictures, or any other medium. There is thus no
such thing as nonsymbolic speech; there is only speech that employs
symbols that are less or more conventional."'
Would it help, then, to begin with the idea that all speech is symbolic
speech? This seems possible, yet one complication is that many of our
borderline speech cases are, like O'Brien," thought of as symbolic conduct
cases. We must then ask whether the symbolic conduct at issue should
count as symbolic speech. This might make a difference because even if we
assume that all speech is symbolic, it is less clear that all voluntary conduct
is also symbolic.45 We would still need to distinguish symbolic, voluntary
conduct from non-symbolic, voluntary conduct.
And as it happens, there may also be cases of non-symbolic speech, or
even cases where the symbolic aspects of the speech in question are legally
irrelevant. Professor Hayakawa interestingly takes note of "the presymbolic
42. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Professor Eugene Volokh has argued that the
original intent was to treat symbolic expression and verbal speech as equivalent for purposes of
protection or regulation under the First Amendment. See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and
the Original Meaning ofthe First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2009).
43. LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION? 8 (2005).
44. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
45. Consider the following: If I were to pat my pockets elaborately, as an indication that I am
searching for something, but without really searching, this gesture may amount to symbolic conduct,
where the conduct conventionally symbolizes my being out of cash. This gesture will of course vary
with context and culture. By contrast, if I were to functionally use a handkerchief to clean my
glasses, is it inescapable that a symbolic message is intended? Doubtless a Sherlock Holmes-like (or
a Doctor Gregory House-like) observer may infer a number of my beliefs from this voluntary
conduct, as he could from my overall appearance. (My desire to see slightly more clearly might be
one such inference.) But, in typical contexts, have I intended to send this message? And, even if so,
have I sent this message, through my conduct, symbolically? This conclusion seems uncertain at
best.
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character of much of our talk ... ." He provides an example of warning
where someone inadvertently steps off a curb and into the path of an
oncoming car.47 In such a case, the verbal content of what we say, or shout,
may be irrelevant. 4 8 The words uttered may vary almost indefinitely.49 The
warning shout might be in any language, including those not understood by
the person stepping off the curb.o What matters, according to Professor
Hayakawa, "is the fear expressed in the loudness and the tone of the
cry ... and not the words." 5'
This example shows that we care about non-symbolic speech. What is
less clear is whether this type of warning shout implicates any of the major
reasons for protecting freedom of speech.5 2 Imagine a social Darwinists
government's prohibiting the utterance of pre-symbolic warning cries. Even
if we thought such a prohibition raised a genuine free speech issue, we might
also agree that such cases would be better adjudicated under a substantive
due process theory,54 or perhaps even under equal protection. 5 In general, a
focus on symbolism and pre-symbolism can provide us with particular
insights, but only within a plainly limited scope of applicability.
V. CAN JUDGES BYPASS THE COMPLEXITIES BY SIMPLY ASSUMING THE
PRESENCE OF "SPEECH?"
We thus begin to appreciate the complexities of distinguishing speech
from non-speech for First Amendment purposes. At this point, it is natural
to wonder whether the courts cannot simply bypass the complexities.
Whether the activity of the putative speaker should count as constitutional
speech is only a preliminary question. Answering in the affirmative
certainly does not resolve the case on the merits in favor of the speaker.
46. S.I. HAYAKAWA & ALAN R. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 56 (5th ed.
1991).
47. Id
48. Id.
49. Id
50. Id ("[I]t doesn't much matter whether someone yells, 'Look out!' or 'Kiwotsuke!' or 'Hey!'
or 'Prends garde!' or simply screams, so long as whatever noise made is uttered loud enough to
alarm us.").
5 1. Id.
52. See infra Part VI.
53. See, e.g., the forthright language of Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind.. . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.") (citation omitted).
54. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. This assumes the existence of some recognizable target of such government regulation, as
might be found in Buck, 274 U.S. at 206-07.
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Not surprisingly, a number of courts, when faced with borderline
speech, have merely assumed the putative speaker to have engaged in speech
for constitutional purposes. Merely for the sake of the argument, speech is
assumed, and the court must then find some legitimate way to conclude that
even if speech is thus assumed, the regulation can nonetheless be upheld.
If the assumed speech would instead be protected by the First Amendment,
no bypass can take place.ss But the theory is that if the government
regulation at issue can be upheld whether speech is present or not, the court
need not stop to decide the threshold speech or non-speech issue.5 9
This tactic seems defensible at first blush. Certainly there are legitimate
interests in judicial economy and in the avoidance of a court's unnecessarily
addressing questions at a constitutional level.60 But there are distinct limits
56. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) ("We assume
for present purposes but do not decide" that "overnight sleeping [in a public park] in connection with
the demonstration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment.")
(finding no First Amendment violation); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (draft
card burning case) ("[E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the
destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity.") (finding no First
Amendment violation); Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2008)
("In light of the foregoing we do not reach the question of whether wearing the Top Hatters
[motorcycle club] clothing and insignia constituted expressive conduct."); Jacobs v. Clark County
Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 428 n.22 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e ... assume (without deciding) that
wearing clothing different from one's classmates is sufficiently expressive of a student's views about
non-conformity to merit First Amendment protection.") (mandatory public school dress codes
upheld against compelled speech challenge under intermediate scrutiny standard hypothetically
applied); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 765 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[Wle ultimately need
not decide whether the plaintiffs' boycott of the game constitutes 'inherently expressive' conduct
encompassed by the First Amendment, because even if it does the boycott was properly punished
under Tinker."); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2001) ("For
the purposes of this opinion, we . .. again[] assume without deciding[] that the First Amendment
applies to the expressive conduct implicated in the mandatory [public school] Uniform Policy.")
(policy on that basis does not, under the O'Brien test, violate the students' free speech rights);
Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 441 & 441 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) ("For purposes of
this opinion,.. . we assume that the First Amendment applies to the students' choice of clothing.")
(finding no First Amendment violation).
57. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
58. But cf Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 428 n.22 (assuming that wearing clothing different from one's
classmates warrants First Amendment protection, thus bypassing the question of whether the
expression is actually speech or not).
59. See Pinard, 467 F.3d at 765.
60. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). For discussion, see R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How
Courts Legitimize What They Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 167, 179-80 (1997); Frederick Schauer,
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 71 (emphasizing some underappreciated costs of some
forms of Ashwander narrowness).
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to and costs of this tactic as well. Most obviously, despite the popularity of
the tactic,' there should be many instances in which no "bypass" of the
initial speech or non-speech decision is possible. Indeed, in many cases
where a court grants that the claimant's conduct amounts to speech in the
constitutional sense, the free speech interests at stake should outweigh the
countervailing interests in, say, public orderliness.62 In all such instances,
the outcome of the case differs in accordance with whether speech is found
to be present or not. No bypass is thus possible in all such cases.
As well, the bypass approach may tend, on balance, to retard the
progressive development and enforcement of First Amendment rights. This
is a broad-ranging and complex matter that cannot be treated in detail here.
In summary fashion, though, we can say that qualified immunity protects
many individual government actors from personal liability where the
plaintiff cannot show that the free speech right in question was clearly
established, usually at a rather specific level of detail,6 at the time of the
alleged violation.s
The problem, in our context, is that the Court's bypassing the question
of whether speech, or any kind of free speech right, is present in a given case
impairs any future plaintiffs ability to show that the free speech right in
question was clearly and specifically established. How could it have been
established if prior courts had merely assumed, without actually ruling upon,
its existence?66 It is not difficult to imagine that judicially minimizing the
scope of personal liability in any context may affect the willingness of
government actors to engage in the underlying, challenged behavior.67
The bypass strategy is also disturbing in more subtle ways-some clear,
some speculative. For one thing, the First Amendment seems central to our
61. For a mere sampling, see the cases cited supra note 56.
62. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (upholding leaflet distribution in the
street against (indirect) littering concerns); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
(political speech, even of an insulting sort, outweighs risks of public convenience or unrest); Collin
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (series of obstacles to Skokie march by Illinois Nazis all
struck down as violative of First Amendment). See also Associated Press, Judge: Blaring Your Car
Horn Is Not Free Speech (June 9, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msncom/id/31192720/ (quoting Judge
Richard J. Thorpe's ruling that "[h]orn honking which is done to annoy or harass others is not
speech").
63. See generally R. George Wright, Qualified and Civic Immunity in Section 1983 Actions:
What Do Justice and Efficiency Require?, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1989), See also, e.g., Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (construing and elaborating on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and an implied qualified immunity defense); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 813
(2009) (modifying the requirement under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), that some decision
be made on the constitutional merits before deciding the qualified immunity issue).
64. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41; Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
65. See Wright, supra note 63, at 4-5.
66. See supra note 56 for cases illustrating this point.
67. We again bypass certain complications addressed in Wright, supra note 63.
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core, collective self-understanding as a broadly-liberal constitutional
democracy.68 If this is so, can it be healthy to repeatedly confess that we
cannot confidently draw the most fundamental distinction involved on any
principled, or even merely pragmatic, basis? And, more speculatively, is
there not some risk that we may wind up unintentionally undervaluing, and
perhaps in some cases trivializing, freedom of speech through our frequent
recourse to the bypass tactic?
On this latter point, we might wonder whether judges may sometimes
unconsciously bias their valuation of what they, for the sake of argument,
merely assume to be speech. A mere assumption that the activity in question
is speech may often leave the court with only an abstract, dry, bloodless,
unexamined, superficial sense of how speech should be valued in the case at
bar. Freedom of speech is, after all, only partly a matter of the abstract
calculations of interests. Importantly, it is also a matter of emotion,6 9 of
commitment, and of collective self-image and identity.
By analogy, there may be a difference in how we are willing to treat a
hypothetically-assumed human being and an unmistakable individual human
being who stands before us. This is not to suggest that, for example, an item
of clothing like a lettered jacket is more vivid and concrete when we declare
it to be speech than when we merely assume it to be so. But when we
genuinely and fully recognize some item, conduct, or symbolic activity to be
speech, we have perhaps only then brought all of our values and emotional
associations with free speech fully into play. And again, at a subconscious
level, a judge must know that somehow underplaying-emotionally or
otherwise-the value of the merely-assumed speech may help justify the
bypass. Only if the assumed speech is deemed to be outweighed by the
conflicting governmental interests can the problem of the scope of speech
conveniently be left unresolved.
68. A sense of this can be drawn from LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 14-15 (Irving Dilliard ed. 1959). Or one could compare one's
intuitive sense of the First Amendment with the discussion in JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-
118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1984) (1859). Jurisprudentially, see, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (Ohio law that failed to distinguish mere advocacy from incitement to lawless action held
to be in violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments).
69. For merely one aspect of the relationships between free speech and emotion, see R. George
Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 429 (2003).
Perhaps the best statement of the emotive power and appeal of freedom of speech is set forth by
Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Something of this latter argument is clearly suggested by Justices
Marshall and Brennan, dissenting in the Clark "sleeping in the park" case."
Marshall and Brennan forthrightly declare the sleeping activity in context to
be symbolic protest speech under the First Amendment," and then point out
one risk of merely assuming it to be so: "[t]he Court thereby avoids
examining closely the reality of respondents' planned expression. The
majority's approach denatures the respondent's asserted right and thus
makes all too easy identification of a Government interest sufficient to
warrant its abridgment." 72 Perhaps a loose analogy could be drawn to the
difference, in a jury trial, between merely stipulating in abstract terms to
some admittedly-damaging fact, and having that fact actually proved to the
jury in some graphic, vivid fashion that casts one's client in a new and
unfavorable light.
We may say, in sum, that courts cannot consistently and fairly bypass
the distinction between speech and non-speech in the constitutional sense by
merely assuming its presence and still upholding the regulation. In many of
the cases in which they seek to do so, there are a number of important risks
and costs associated with this bypass tactic.74
Based on the results so far, the best course is to make as much progress
as we can in clarifying the speech and non-speech distinction, while
simultaneously appreciating the limits of the various approaches discussed
above. Surely, in a broadly pragmatist culture such as our own,76 we
should continue to focus on the crucial purposes, functions, and values
sought to be served by distinctively recognizing speech as a constitutionally
valued category.
We must also admit that there is no unique and entirely uncontroversial
list of the values thought to underlie the Free Speech Clause.n But it is fair
to say that three basic values78 arise repeatedly in mainstream accounts of
70. See Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 301, 302 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
71. See id. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 302.
73. For some general theory on this point, see Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-88
(1997).
74. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 18-73 and accompanying text.
76. See generally CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra
B. Rosenthal, Carl R. Hausman & Douglas R. Anderson eds., 1999).
77. Even if such a list existed, we could hardly assume that one or more of the listed values could
not possibly be promoted as well by constitutionally protecting individual activities distinct from
speech-perhaps a right to a basic education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
78. Each of these three values is classically articulated in MILL, supra note 68, and in the modem
American jurisprudential context by Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
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such matters, even where there are differences in emphasis. First is the
value of the pursuit of truth, or at the very least, the possibility of truth, in
some important sense of the term. Second is the value of a stable,
responsive, democratic government and administration.80 Third, and finally,
would be the value of individual or group self-actualization, development,
self-realization, and autonomous decision making in some recognizable
sense. 81
We can abbreviate these basic free speech values as truth, democracy,
and self-realization. To those with a certain cast of mind, it would be very
tempting to decide free speech questions-including questions of what
should count as speech for constitutional purposes-by direct and immediate
recourse to these widely recognized free speech values. The basic free
speech values are an obvious reference point. In the simplest case, if the act
of categorizing some activity an instance of speech were to distinctively
promote the one of the above-mentioned free speech values, the activity
would count as "speech." If, on the other hand, labeling that activity
"speech" would not promote or implicate any of the basic free speech
values, then the activity would not, on this direct and immediate approach,
count as speech.
VI. THE INTERACTIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF THE BASIC FREE
SPEECH VALUES, GENERAL RULES, MID-LEVEL HEURISTICS, AND SPECIFIC
CONTEXTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
Whatever the appeal of this direct and immediate focus on free speech
values in themselves may be, we must admit that the case law's
COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and
Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1137 (1984).
79. See supra notes 18-73 and accompanying text; see also JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND
OF EDUCATION 6 (George H. Sabine ed., 1951) (1640) ("'Tis true, no age can restore a live,
whereof, perhaps, there is no great loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a
rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse."). Among the contemporary
literature, see William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search For Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995) and Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the
Theory ofFree Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 649 (1987).
80. See supra note 77; see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
47-69 (1992); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521; MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY (2001).
81. See generally Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 443 (1998).
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pragmatism 82 does not usually take such a form. More typically, courts
develop tests at a level of generality somewhere between the ultimate values
and purposes at stake and the concrete circumstances and facts of any given
case.83 Thus, courts typically do not ask directly whether some instance of
alleged obscenity promotes any of the recognized free speech values; they
more directly apply something like the particularized Miller test. 84
Perhaps attempting to decide cases of what counts as speech by direct
reference to the basic free speech values by themselves would enmesh courts
in unnecessary abstraction, generality, and indeterminacy. This certainly
does not mean that either courts or theorists should endorse but then
practically ignore free speech values. On the one hand, broad free speech
values by themselves cannot replace well-crafted specific and contextualized
judicial tests. On the other hand, if we never compare our cases on the scope
of speech with the basic aims and values we intend to promote by protecting
free speech, we would eventually risk an arbitrary, inconsistent, or
misguided set of case law in this respect.
This conclusion suggests that, though we do not appeal directly to the
free speech values in order to determine what should count as speech, we
should recurringly check our results in such cases by some indirect
application of those values. In particular, we have at our disposal the
technique of "reflective equilibrium." 6 In the simplest case, this technique
would suggest that we fine tune our understanding of both what should
count as speech and the precise contours of the free speech values by a sort
of back-and-forth, or reciprocal reference, between each in light of the other.
In the end, this ongoing process of mutual testing and adjustment may lead
us to revised understandings of the proper scope of speech, of our basic free
speech values, or both.
82. See, e.g., THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND
CULTURE (Morris R. Dickstein ed., 1999).
83. In the various contexts of libel, obscenity, or public employee speech, courts do not simply
hold the facts up alongside the basic free speech values; instead, courts develop and apply various
contextualized tests. See supra note 2.
84. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
85. For discussion of some related problems, see generally R. George Wright, Why Free Speech
Cases Are as Hard (And as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335 (2001).
86. The crucial source of the technique of "reflective equilibrium" is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 20, 46-51 (2d prtg. 1972). See also Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Apr. 28, 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium.;
Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256
(1979). For legal application of the technique, see Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism,
Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1990). Relatedly, see R. George Wright, Two Models of Constitutional
Adjudication, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1357 (1991); R. George Wright, Cumulative Case Legal Arguments
and the Justification ofAcademic Affirmative Action, 23 PACE L. REV. 1 (2002).
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Thus, at any point in the analysis of what counts as speech, we should
feel free to assess whether any particular theory, test, or concrete result best
comports with our current understanding of the relevant basic free speech
values. This reflective equilibrium technique can certainly be applied at any
stage of our own analysis below.
As a typical first step in determining whether some activity, or some
general category of activity, should count as speech, we should first look, at
least for a moment, for the nearly ideal: a cheaply, and easily-applied,
reasonably-accurate, yet quite simple set of categories, into which the
putative instance of speech or type of speech can be placed. Suppose, by
analogy, we wish to discover whether some number counts as a prime
number or not. It will be helpful if we already have a category-imperfect,
but typically useful-of "not prime because divisible by two." If the number
in question is indeed divisible by two, then our simple and reasonably
accurate categorical rule and classification will typically steer us right, at
low cost. The value, in proper contexts, of general rules is thus clear.
In the more general, legal realm, Professor Richard Epstein has
emphasized the value of employing relatively broad, simple, predictable, and
easily applied rules and categories when resolving even complex cases. 7
And in our cases, simple categorical rules will often have value for judicial
attempts to classify the activity in question as speech or not. For example, in
the rare cases in which a standard published text may not fall within the
scope of the Free Speech Clause,88 we may be better-off accepting the
published text as speech, whether then-legally sanctionable or not, on the
basis of its categorical status as a recognizable book. A court might instead
launch into a much more contextualized, nuanced, and detailed inquiry as to
whether speech really is involved. It is hardly clear whether such a costlier
inquiry would usually pay off in terms either of outcome accuracy or
outcome predictability.89
On the side of exclusion, we might be well-advised to adopt the broad,
simple, categorical rule that speech for First Amendment purposes requires
87. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). For
commentary, see Joseph P. Tomain, Simple Rules for the Regulatory State, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 409
(1996) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995)) and Steven
Walt, 109 ETHICS 193 (1998) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (1995)). See also R. George Wright, The Illusion ofSimplicity: An Explanation of Why the
Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 715 (2000).
88. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 263-64, 267 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
"Hit Man," a 130 page manual about effective murder techniques with unusual party stipulations, an
extreme case under Brandenburg).
89. For the more generally applicable logic, see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 87.
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some relevant, voluntary act on the part of the speaker.90 But where cheaply
and easily applied, or where simple and reasonably accurate categorical rules
are not available, judges may, at the opposite extreme, make highly
contextualized and circumstance-sensitive inquires into whether speech is
involved in a given case.
Such highly contextualized inquires into whether a specific activity
amounts, under the circumstances, to speech may often be both necessary
and worthwhile. We can refer to these kinds of inquiries as akin to an
approach to moral philosophy known as "particularism." 9' Moral
particularism, and particularism as applied by analogy to the scope of the
speech problem, distrusts and de-emphasizes broad rules, principles,
sweeping tests, and abstract or uniformly applied standards.92 Instead,
particularism emphasizes recourse to analogies, hypotheticals, images,
stories, parables, fables, legends, myths, dreams, narratives, concrete
incidents, and other, similar techniques in deciding individual cases. 93 But
particularism, no less than general rules, has limits on its scope of useful
applicability.
Mid-way between broad, categorical rules 94 on the one hand and
context-intensive particularism95 on the other are what we might call middle-
range heuristics. That is, we can imagine techniques that cannot qualify as
uniform, but are still of broader applicability than, say, a context-bound
90. For a reasonably close case, see HAYAKAWA & HAYAKAWA, supra note 46, at 56 (discussing
how the voluntary action of creating sounds to express thoughts has remained despite the expansion
of human consciousness). Or, in the appropriately narrow context, consider a completely
involuntary and unintended public grimace, or startled reaction, in response to some politician, for
which the hapless, reacting party is then punished. Even if we do not treat utterly involuntary
reactions as "speech," objection to punishment for such reactions, perhaps on Substantive Due
Process or Cruel and Unusual Punishment grounds, is still possible. See, e.g., Constitutional Law-
Eighth Amendment-Ninth Circuit Holds that "Involuntary" Conduct Cannot Be Punished, 120
HARV. L. REV. 829 (2007) (discussing Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated as moot, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (alleged punishment for involuntary, elemental acts
of homeless persons)).
91. The leading exposition of moral particularism is JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT
PRINCIPLES 73 (2004) ("Particularism [is where] the possibility of moral thought and judgment does
not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles"). See also generally MORAL
PARTICULARISM (Brad Hooker & Margaret Oliva Little eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (2000);
CHALLENGING MORAL PARTICULARISM (Mark Norris Lance et al. eds., 2008). For a sustained
critique, see SEAN MCKEEVER & MICHAEL RIDGE, PRINCIPLED ETHICS: GENERALISM AS A
REGULATIVE IDEAL (2006). For legal applications, see R. George Wright, Dreams and Formulas:
The Roles ofParticularism and Principlism in the Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195 (2009).
92. See generally DANCY, supra note 91 at 73-94. See also Jonathan Dancy, Moral
Particularism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (rev. ed. Jan. 14, 2009),
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/moral-particularism.
93. See supra note 89.
94. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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intuition. These middle-range heuristics, too, may play a useful
complementary role in classifying speech.
Among such possible middle-range heuristics, consider, for example,
taking into account the realistic costs a putative speaker would have faced in
turning a borderline case of marginal speech into a substantially easier case
by focusing on the precise question of speech or non-speech for
constitutional purposes. Suppose that a putative speaker casually left his or
her speech somewhere near the hazy borderline of what constitutes speech,
but at very low cost could, without distorting any message or abandoning a
desired audience, have easily presented a much clearer case of speech.
In such a close case, we may assume the speaker has, in effect,
heedlessly imposed unnecessary costs on the judicial system in resolving a
difficult issue where the costs to the speaker in every relevant respect of
presenting an easier case were low. In such cases, one could argue that there
is, all else equal, an argument96 for deciding the unnecessarily close and
costly issue97 of speech or non-speech against the heedless putative speaker.
Such an argument would have a basis in fairness and incentives to
efficiency.98
This technique is related to the linguistic philosopher Paul Grice's much
broader "Cooperative Principle."" Grice's injunction is to "[m]ake your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
you are engaged."' 00 A related idea is Professor P.F. Strawson's observation
that we can often, though hardly always, offer a "force-elucidating
comment"'o' on our own message.102
As one type of example concerning the possible judicial use of this
particular middle-range heuristic technique, consider the remarkably
numerous appellate cases posing the issue of whether nude sunbathing
96. For a variant of this basic argument in a related context, see R. George Wright, Speech on
Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REv. 27, 31-32 (1987) (developing
applicable clarifications).
97. This particular technique would have no application for easy cases in either direction-to
either clear "speech" or to clear "non-speech"-where the technique would be unnecessary in any
event.
98. See Wright, supra note 96, at 31-32.
99. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 26 (1989).
100. Id.
101. P.F. Strawson, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, 73 PHIL. REV. 439, 451 (1964)
(emphasis omitted).
102. See id.
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should count as speech for First Amendment purposes. 0 3 If we consider
either the category of nude sunbathing, or the particular instance of nude
sunbathing at issue, to be either clearly speech or else clearly not speech,
then we will have no need for middle-range heuristics. But if, on the other
hand, we take the nude sunbathing case at issue to be difficult, or somehow
costly to decide, then we may find value in such middle-range heuristics.
In particular, in such a case we might ask whether the nude sunbather-
the putative speaker-could cheaply and easily, and without distorting the
message or abandoning the preferred audience, have presented a much
clearer instance of speech. In effect, the courts could ask whether such a
speaker could have easily turned a judicially costly borderline case of speech
into a clear or mainstream case of speech.
As to how a putative speaker could practically undertake such a task, the
limits are set, in part, merely by imagination. In general, one could conduct
oneself before, during, and after the nude sunbathing-again, assuming the
activity itself presents a close case of speech-in such a way as to enhance
the ratio of speech-elements to non-speech elements. One could also create
in advance a clear, explanatory website or Facebook page. One could also
widely distribute thoughtful literature as part of a significant but low cost
campaign. Or one could explicitly proselytize before, during, and perhaps
even after the arrest.
None of these speech-enhancing activities, even in combination, can
guarantee that an instance of nude sunbathing will be judicially treated as
speech, whether ultimately protected or not.104 Courts may categorically
regard nude sunbathing cases as easy, non-speech cases where the above
heuristic would not apply. It is also likely that some courts, in this and other
contexts, simply fail to carefully distinguish between non-speech and speech
in a way that can be appropriately regulated.o But, if a court does regard a
103. See, e.g., S. Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984) (no First
Amendment right to sunbathe or otherwise publicly associate in the nude); Craft v. Hodel, 683 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Mass. 1988) (prohibition of nude sunbathing valid as against women who wished to
bathe in the nude in a national park in order to protest exploitation of women in American society);
DeWald v. Wyner, 674 So. 2d 836, 838 n.1, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (otherwise nude
sunbather literally covering self with printed copy of the Bill of Rights); People v. Hollman, 500
N.E.2d 297 (N.Y. 1986) (nude sunbathing insufficiently "expressive" to invoke First Amendment
protection in the absence of some other form of protected expression); Lacour v. State, 21 S.W.3d
794 (Tex. App. 2000) (nudity on remote public beach as mere conduct as opposed to expressive
conduct protected by First Amendment).
104. Some such activity was undertaken by the putative speaker in a number of the cases cited
above, to minimal legal effect. See, e.g., DeWald, 674 So. 2d at 838 n.1, 839.
105. Further examples include "casual chit-chat" cases where a lack of precision in distinguishing
non-speech from speech is, on balance, subject to regulation under the circumstances. See, e.g.,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (casual chit-chat case within the context of public
employee free speech); Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 884-87 (7th Cir. 2003) (casual chit-chat
effectively treated as both non-speech for First Amendment purposes and, on balance, as unprotected
speech); Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990) (ambiguous treatment of casual chit-chat).
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particular nude sunbathing case as a borderline speech case, the application
of the above mid-level heuristic test should be useful in making the initial
speech versus non-speech distinction.
At some point, however, our useful middle-range heuristics will run out.
We must then, in complementary fashion, draw on some combination of our
various, broader theoretical understandings of speech and our best,
particularized understandings in those contexts-again with constant regard
to the basic purposes of protecting speech in the first place. 106
VII. THE SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GENERAL THEORISTS
OF MEANING
Suppose a judge must decide whether to credit some putative speech
with being speech in the constitutional sense. We might consider the
possible contributions of the general theorists of meaning. Theorists of
meaning can tell us that, for example, we have several possible places to
look for meaning. We could look for sentence meaning in the mind of the
speaker, but the speaker may be speaking less than forthrightly, for
legitimate or illegitimate reasons. 10 7 Or we could look for sentence meaning
In Swank, Judge Posner argues:
The purpose of the free-speech clause ... is to protect the market in ideas, broadly
understood as the public expression of ideas, narratives, concepts, imagery, opinions-
scientific, political, or aesthetic-to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform,
edify, or entertain. Casual chit-chat ... is unrelated, or largely so, to that marketplace,
and is not protected. Such conversation is important to its participants but not to the
advancement of knowledge, the transformation of taste, political change, cultural
expression, and the other objectives, values, and consequences of the speech that is
protected by the First Amendment.
Id at 1250-51 (citation omitted). See also King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("[A]n order to sell, like a threat intended to intimidate[] is not the kind of verbal act that
the First Amendment protects." Such speech "has no connection to the marketplace of ideas and
opinions, whether political, scientific, aesthetic, or even commercial.") (citations omitted). One
uncontroversial clarification would be that the Free Speech Clause protects not only public
expression, but also preliminary activities thereto, such as the opportunity to think, to organize one's
thoughts, and to record one's thoughts and other researched material in forms not intended for public
dissemination. Materials such as a diary, a book of observations, or a paper or electronic notebook
might beintended to serve only as a resource for later public speech. Perhaps more controversial is
Judge Posner's apparent reduction of the purposes of freedom of speech to merely protecting the
marketplace of ideas. It is unclear, for example, that protecting the marketplace of ideas also
captures all that is commonly intended by the self-realizational value of free speech. See supra notes
75 & 78 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the technique of reflective
equilibrium).
107. See C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE
INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM 192-93 (Harcourt
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in the mind of the listener, but the listener could variously misconstrue an
intended meaning. 08 So we might then say that "[t]he meaning of any
sentence is what the speaker intends to be understood from it by the
listener." 09
This, by itself, is only a minimal result. Yet, it does suggest, against the
background of the basic purposes of free speech, that a speaker, for free
speech purposes, must intend his or her speech to be understood by some
listener in some more or less determinate fashion. In the absence of the
speaker's intent to promote some more or less determinate understanding,
we may be skeptical that speech in the constitutional sense is present. Some
protectable speech, even profoundly valuable speech, may not be perfectly
understood even by the speaker, and the speaker's intent with respect to
audience comprehension may also be hazy. Moreover, audience members
will often differ dramatically in their capacities to understand the message
being conveyed. But beneath some baseline level of intent-which may
depend on context-it will be difficult to maintain that the basic free speech
values are distinctively implicated.
Whether a speaker's intention to be more or less distinctly understood
by one or more members of an audience on a significant subject is sufficient,
as well as necessary, for constitutional speech is a more difficult question.
Suppose a political dissenter seeks to use an electronic sound system to
address a willing audience on a political subject, and is then arrested on a
minor charge when the sound system repeatedly generates only disturbing
feedback, but absolutely no speech, amplified or otherwise. Presumably, we
would want to allow the would-be speaker to raise some sort of free speech
defense. But in such a case there seems to be only an intent to speak, or to
convey a message, and no actual speech."o Moreover, perhaps some
members of the audience anticipate the intended message. The role of intent
in constitutional speech is thus surprisingly complex.
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1989) (1923).
108. See id. at 193.
109. See id. (emphasis omitted). As Robyn Carston highlights, obvious complications arise,
particularly in situations where the speaker expresses irony. See ROBYN CARSTON, THOUGHTS AND
UTTERANCES: THE PRAGMATICS OF EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION 15 (2002) ("[Tlhere is often a
divergence between what a person says and what she means, between the meaning of the linguistic
expression she uses and the meaning she seeks to communicate . . . ."); see also GRICE, supra note
99, at 219 (explaining the concept of meaning as involving an intent to induce a belief in the
audience where the audience is to recognize and, at least in part, be motivated by such a speaker's
intent).
110. It is not clear whether the law generally recognizes a distinctive "attempted speech" defense.
See, e.g., Pesek v. City of Brunswick, 794 F. Supp. 768, 798 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (noting that
reasonable officials might differ on whether "attempted speech" was protected by the First
Amendment).
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VIII. CONTEMPORARY GENERAL THEORIES OF AMBIGUITY AND
VAGUENESS AND THEIR PRAGMATIC APPLICATION
Often, a speaker's intentions with respect to communication are
complex and multi-layered."' A speaker's intentions can be ambiguous, and
"ambiguity" itself can have several forms.' 12 But ambiguity is usually not at
the heart of the speech versus non-speech problem. Suppose, for example,
that a public school student is accused of wearing a prohibited gang symbol
in school, and that the student responds by arguing that he or she intends the
symbol (more or less plausibly) in its more historical or religious sense." 3
Such a case may represent an ambiguous communication, yet it seems
unlikely that the symbol will count as speech only if interpreted in one of
these two ways but not the other. It seems equally inequitable to discount
the symbol as speech because it is ambiguous as between the two meanings,
both of which might in and of themselves count as speech. It is not as
though the symbol is so broadly and variously ambiguous, with no timely
clarification by the putative speaker, that we would conclude that any
possible speaker intent has drowned in a sea of ambiguity.
Thus, a speaker's ambiguity, at least up to a point, will not usually
deprive an expression of its character as speech.1 4 Instead, the more typical
problems at the boundaries of speech are the arguable insufficiency of any
intended meaning, the arguably excessive vagueness of the putative speech,
and the underlying vagueness of the idea of speech itself, in both the
standard dictionary and the constitutional senses.
For example, the speech versus non-speech problem in the flag-burning
case of Texas v. Johnson"i5 was not that the act of burning the flag, in
context, was ambiguous between two distinct meanings, one of which
sufficed for First Amendment purposes and one of which did not. Instead,
the more attractive approaches to the case would have been to find
Johnson's (perhaps ambiguous) symbolic act to be somewhat vague and
111. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 101, at 452.
112. See WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY 5-6 (New Directions 1966) (1930)
("'[A]mbiguity' itself can mean an indecision as to what you mean, an intention to mean several
things, a probability that one or other or both of two things has been meant, and the fact that a
statement has several meanings.").
113. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997).
114. Nor does this seem to depend systematically on whether the speaker's ambiguity is
intentional or not; speakers sometimes avoid maximum clarity for practical or political reasons. See,
for example, the explicit guardedness of the defendant's speech in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919) (upholding Debs's conviction).
115. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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inarticulate, but to nonetheless count it as symbolic speech,' 16 or else to find
excessive vagueness in his act, and therefore an insufficiency of any
intended message.' 17 A similar analysis would perhaps apply to the
controversial student banner in Morse v. Frederick,'18 otherwise referred to
as the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" case."9
What, then, does the literature of vagueness tell us about either the
vagueness of speech itself, or about individual expressions that are near the
boundaries of constitutional speech because of their vagueness? The
technical theory of vagueness has been developed in directions extending
beyond our present needs.120 For our purposes, some basic insights into the
humblest cases of vagueness are needed, as in the vague idea of baldness,
and a consideration of whether some borderline case counts as one of
baldness or not.
We have already committed ourselves to a purposive, functional, and
pragmatic approach to deciding what counts as speech, based ultimately on
promoting the crucial values that underlie our desire to protect free
speech. 12 1 A pragmatic approach to the question of whether someone is bald
or not would focus on what practical interests are at stake in such a case. A
similarly pragmatic approach to whether certain activity should count as
speech would also focus on the values and interests1 22 at stake, in context, 12 3
116. See id at 406.
117. See id at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[F]Iag burning is the equivalent of an
inarticulate grunt or roar .... .").
118. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
119. See id at 396. For a sense of the insufficiency of meaning claim, see id at 444 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("This is a nonsense message, not advocacy.").
120. See, e.g., Trenton Merricks, Varieties of Vagueness, 62 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
145 (2001) (distinguishing metaphysical-level vagueness (vagueness as "built-in"); epistemological
vagueness (vagueness as a matter of our ignorance of some relevant fact); and linguistic vagueness,
but denying that linguistic vagueness should count as a separate category of vagueness); Keith C.
Culver, Varieties of Vagueness, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 109, 115 (2004) (noting the discussion of "no
less than ten varieties of vagueness"). For one example of (vaguely) related but distinct attempts at
analyzing vagueness, see Roy A. Sorensen, Vagueness Within the Language of Thought, 41 PHIL. Q.
389, 389 (1991) ("The simplest explanation is that a [vague or] borderline statement is an
unknowable truth or falsehood."); see also Max Black, Vagueness: An Exercise in Logical Analysis,
4 PHIL. ScI. 427, 429 (1937) (discussing vagueness as inherent in scientific discourse); George
Lakoff, A Note On Vagueness and Ambiguity, I LINGUISTIC INQUIRY 357, 357 (1970) ("It is
generally agreed that certain sentences are ambiguous, while others are vague."); Robert C. Post,
Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REV. 491 (1994); R.G.
Swinbume, Vagueness, Inexactness, and Imprecision, 19 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 281 (1969); Jeremy
Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REv. 509, 513
n.9 (1994) (defining "vagueness," and observing that "[t]he terms 'vagueness,' 'contestability,' and
'ambiguity' are themselves vague, contestable and ambiguous").
121. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
122. See Delia Graff, Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness, 28 PHIL. TOPICS
45, 49-54 (2000).
123. See Diana Raffinan, Vagueness and Context-Relativity, 81 PHIL. STUD. 175, 175 (1996)
("The correct application of a vague predicate varies with context.").
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in such a determination. Most simply put, would we more optimally
promote the recognized free speech values 24 by classifying a given activity
as speech, or by denying that activity recognition as speech?
Clearly we should bear in mind that neither option, calling almost
everything speech, nor calling almost nothing speech, is likely to optimally
promote the crucial reasons for protecting speech in the first place. 125 Too
narrow a view risks repressively excluding novel methods of communication
that clearly implicate the free speech values.126  Too broad a view risks
diluting and trivializing, and eventually even subverting, the constitutionally
fundamental status of speech. 127
A pragmatic, contextual, interest-based approach to classifying
borderline cases of speech is thus justified by the academic literature.128 Of
course, not all the pragmatic considerations, and not all the free speech
values in particular, will always line up neatly and unequivocally either for
or against counting some particular activity as speech.'29  Particularized
judgment, guided by principle, will then be necessary in such cases.130
Nor can we eliminate all traces of vagueness in the general idea of
speech, or in classifying particular acts as either speech or non-speech. As
the philosopher J.L. Austin once observed: "The actual world is, to all
human intents and purposes, indefinitely various; but we cannot handle an
indefinitely large vocabulary; nor, generally speaking, do we wish to insist
on the minutest detectable differences.. ..". Any attempt to eliminate
vagueness in classifying speech would be unworkably complex, and would
124. Of course, in any given case the various free speech values may point in contrasting
directions, or may appear on both sides of the argument. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 85.
125. Calling almost everything speech would involve a movement in the direction of overall
conduct libertarianism, or freedom of action, of a sort attractive to John Stuart Mill, supra note 68,
but not clearly inferable from a classic commitment merely to freedom of speech.
126. As in the case of important speech taking the form, for a time, of binary computer code.
127. Protecting too much intentionally-near-to-meaningless speech eventually prompts the
question of why we would sacrifice other social values, including peace and quiet or sheer
convenience, for such a minimal payoff.
128. See, e.g., Pierluigi Chiassoni, Jurisprudence in the Snare of Vagueness, 18 RATIO JuRis 258,
259 (2005) (noting one pragmatic approach to vagueness that involves "extra-linguistic, evaluat[ive]
considerations such as justice, fairness, self-interest, social welfare, [and] law's integrity").
129. See supra note 124.
130. See Culver, supra note 120, at 115 ("[P]ragmatic considerations ... may leave residual
pragmatic vagueness where evaluative considerations surrounding the application of an expression
do not decisively incline competent application one way or another."); see also supra notes 91-92
and accompanying text (discussing the approach of "particularism").
131. J.L. Austin, How to Talk: Some Simple Ways, 53 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. SYSTEMATIC
STUD. PHIL. 227, 239 (1953).
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doubtless involve its own vague language. Such an attempt would thus not
pragmatically promote our relevant interests.
More positively, Professor Jeremy Waldron has noted some value in the
vagueness associated with the idea of speech.'32 In particular, Professor
Waldron sees value in publicly rethinking and debating the boundaries of
speech anew where arguably close cases arise,'33 in part to freshen our sense
of the value of speech and of its protection. Such a debate may be very
valuable. But if we define speech either too narrowly or too broadly, in light
of our basic reasons for protecting speech in the first place, we again risk
either repression1 34 on the one hand, or dilution and trivialization on the
other. 13s
IX. SYNTHESIS, TENSION, AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE SUPREME COURT
OPINIONS ON "SPEECH"
With or without the assistance of the academic theorists, the Supreme
Court itself has attempted to provide guidance on what should count as
speech for First Amendment purposes. The Court declared in United States
v. O'Brien,'36 the draft card burning case, that "[w]e cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea."1 37  This language, however, does little more than recognize the
boundary-drawing problem, as distinct from actually resolving such a
problem.
A plurality opinion in the flag desecration case of Spence v.
Washingtonl38 declared that in the absence of printed or spoken words, the
Court would have to "determine whether [the] activity was sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. . . ."139 The plurality then focused on "the
nature of [the] activity, combined with the factual context and environment
in which it was undertaken"1 40 in finding the activity sufficiently
communicative to amount to protected expression.14 1
132. See Waldron, supra note 120, at 539.
133. See id.
134. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
136. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
137. Id
138. 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam).
139. Id at 409.
140. Id. at 409-10; see also id. at 410 (explaining that "the context may give meaning to the
symbol").
141. See id. at 410.
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Later, in Texas v. Johnson, another flag burning case, a majority of the
Court, again emphasizing the importance of context,142 imposed a rather
demanding test. The majority found sufficiently communicative speech to
be present1 43 and asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and ... [whether] the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."'" It is, however,
unclear how rigorously the Court intended this language to be taken.
One crucial consideration in this regard is the Court's apparent
backtracking in the subsequent St. Patrick's Day parade case of Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.'45 In Hurley,
the Court disapprovingly quoted its own prior language in both Spence and
Johnson.146  The Court concluded that "a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to
expressions conveying a 'particularized message' . . . would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll."l47 Further, the
majority of the Court in the more recent "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" student banner
case of Morse v. Frederick seemed to accept the banner's content-
admittedly, verbal or printed speech, as opposed to symbolic conduct-as
speech for First Amendment purposes.148 But under the circumstances and
context, including the admissions of the purported speaker,149 it is far from
clear that the message, if any, on the banner would pass the Johnson test.150
Johnson, again, would require that, in context, "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" reflect
142. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1991) ("We have not automatically
concluded[] ... that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in
characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which
it occurred.").
143. See id. at 406.
144. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
145. See generally Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557 (1995).
146. See id. at 569.
147. Id. (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411) (citation omitted).
148. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 (2007).
149. See id The weaker and more diffuse the communicative intent, the more relevant becomes
the principle that "[a]n act not intended to be communicative does not acquire the stature of First-
Amendment-protected expression merely because someone, upon leaming of the act, might derive
some message from it." Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir.
1988). Consider also the case of a solitary, early-morning jogger who inadvertently inspires an
unnoticed onlooker.
150. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1991); see also supra note 142 and accompanying
text.
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both an intent to convey a particularized message and a great likelihood that
the message would be understood by the audience as intended.'
The majority in Morse made little effort to fit the banner's message
within either, let alone both, of the Johnson test considerations. As the
majority itself admitted:
The message on Frederick's banner is cryptic. It is no doubt
offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it
probably means nothing at all. Frederick himself claimed "that the
words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras." But
Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by those
viewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation is
plainly a reasonable one.15 2
If we assume that the majority in Johnson was endorsing a test
consisting of two separate and essential elements, rather than something like
merely two relevant factors, it is then difficult to read the Morse discussion
above as applying the Johnson test.
The first element, a speaker's intent to convey a particularized message,
is denied, against his own interest, by the "speaker himself."' Now, there
may be circumstances in which a political dissenter would be better off in
denying any intent to deliver any coherent message. But Frederick is hardly
in a position to take advantage of the free speech law of public schools'5 4 if
he is not engaging in speech. The testimony of the putative speaker cannot
always be decisive on the question of intent. But the typical problem is that
of the speaker self-servingly concocting, after the fact, a coherent,
particularized intent that was not in existence at the time of speaking. 55
Certainly, in Morse, there was little evidence of any speaker intent to
convey any particularized, more or less unequivocal message beyond the
151. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405.
152. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (2006))
(citation omitted).
153. See id.
154. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
155. Commercial barroom nude dancing is almost uncontroversially recognized as speech for First
Amendment purposes, presumably on the basis of an imputed message of disinhibition, only
dubiously intended by each speaker. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000)
(plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991); Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981). Such cases are probably best understood as not requiring
that the speaker have subjectively intended any reasonably particularized, determinate message. See
infra note 160. For perspective, consider that typical social or recreational dancing is generally not
counted as speech. See infra note 168. Mid-way between the recognized commercial nude barroom
dancing speech, noted above, and the non-speech of social or recreational dancing would seem to be
allegedly-lewd but recreational dancing, which seems to fall on the non-speech side. See Willis v.
Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2005).
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"speaker's" own disavowal of any such intent. The majority itself cited
several possible sorts of audience reactions, but audience reactions do not
imply any particularized message, either intended or received. Consider, as
the Morse majority did,'1 6 the case of someone who is offended by, or even
who deems blasphemous, the speaker's reference to "Jesus," precisely
because no particularized speaker message is intended or discernible. Or
consider, as the majority also did,'57 the amused reaction of someone who
merely enjoys the public mention or use of the phrase "Bong Hits," or the
conjoined mentioning of "Bong Hits" and "Jesus," apart from any
particularized message received or intended.
As to the second element of the Johnson test, we need only note that any
great likelihood that Morse's particularized message would have been
understood by his audience" 8 obviously depended on the existence of the
first element of the Johnson test, on speaker intent. As well, the majority
acknowledged several divergent but reasonable audience reactions,159 and
we have just seen that those audience reactions do not always require either
a particularized speaker intent or the understanding of that intent by the
relevant audience.160
In a typical case, of course, audience members may perceive a fairly
wide range of intended messages, and in some cases, only a fraction of the
audience will perceive any intended message, let alone the actual intended
message. But then, the speaker may intend different messages for different
audience members, for various, legitimate reasons. Different messages
intended for different audience members should hardly deprive the speech of
its character as speech for First Amendment purposes. What can we say,
then, of the Court's apparent adoption and then softening of the Johnson test
in cases such as Hurley and Morse?'6' As we shall see in specific
156. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
157. See id.
158. In Morse, the immediate audience consisted of the fellow students, teachers, townspeople,
and visitors, but for the speaker, the crucial audience was claimed to be those watching on television.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
159. See id.
160. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text. It is technically possible to find a high
likelihood that the speaker's intent would be properly understood by the audience, despite the fact
that the actual reactions from the audience give little hint of that. Nevertheless, we would still be
missing the first, or particular intent, element under Johnson.
161. The Court appeared to focus on whether the conduct at issue in the military recruiter campus
access case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47
(2006), could be classified as "inherently expressive" or "not inherently expressive." Id. at 65.
Presumably, what the Court meant is that the conduct of the campus officials was not sufficiently
meaningful apart from the closely associated language of disapproval of the military recruitment
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contexts,16 2 there is value in maintaining touch with some reasonably
interpreted version of the first element of Johnson, requiring some
particularization or determinacy of the speaker's message.'63
It is doubtful that the culture of free speech would suffer, on balance, if
verse that is categorized as pure entertainment nonsense, with no further
cultural or political associations, were left outside a standard First
Amendment test.16 The more important point, though, is that some great
literature, richly deserving of free speech protection, could pass as speech
only under a generously interpreted Johnson test.
Consider, for example, the attempts by the great quantum physicists to
provide some verbal or conceptual interpretation of their pure mathematical
and experimental results.'6 ' Beyond some point, the clarity or determinacy
of meaning of their attempts becomes starkly limited. Certainly, their
internally-diverse intended audience may, with great probability, take away
somewhat diverging interpretations of the author's message. This state of
affairs will also characterize, to an even greater degree, some great
literature, 166 as well as great mystic and religious works'67 of various
policies in question. See id. If words and (other) conduct are genuinely inseparable, they should
presumably be judged together for First Amendment purposes. But it would be a great mistake to
generally focus on whether conduct, or symbolic conduct, or even verbal messages, are "inherently
expressive." Typically, if not inevitably, meaning is in part a matter of context. See, e.g., supra
notes 139-43 and accompanying text. For a related, unduly narrow, non-contextual test, see
Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 885 F.2d 888, 894 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[Clancelling
a contract is not a traditional form of protest."). Why the courts should look to tradition rather than
to context and circumstances is left unexplained. For a slightly broader test, see Santa Monica Food
Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2006) (sitting or lying on the
sidewalk as "not forms of conduct integral to, or commonly associated with, expression" (quoting
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1996))).
162. See infra Part XI.
163. Commercialized barroom nude dancing is probably treated as speech not only in view of
after-the-fact imputed messages, but also because the activity itself has historically been something
of a cultural battleground site, with obvious, broader cultural and political visions and interests at
stake. For the unadorned judicial logic, see the cases cited supra note 155. For one state case that
extends this sort of protection a bit further, see State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 634 (Or. 2005)
(actual sex acts as protected under state free speech provision if criminalized only in the course of
the expressive content of a "live public show").
164. But cf supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text (discussing the unquestioning
"Jabberwocky" protection in Hurley).
165. See generally, e.g., 4 NIELS BOHR, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF NIELS BOHR:
CAUSALITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY (Ox Bow Press 1999); WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND
PHILOSOPHY: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE (1958). See also, NICK HERBERT, QUANTUM
REALITY: BEYOND THE NEW PHYSICs, at xiii (1987) (quoting Nobel laureate Richard Feynman as
saying "it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics"); This Quantum World, The
Real Problem, available at http://thisquantumworld.com/htlindex.php?option=com content&task-
view&id=54&ltemid=46 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (quoting Roger Penrose to the effect that
"quantum theory makes absolutely no sense" and John A. Wheeler as saying "if you are not
completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it").
166. See, e.g., JAMES JOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE (Penguin Classics 2000) (1939); JOSEPH
CAMPBELL & HENRY MORTON ROBINSON, A SKELETON KEY TO FINNEGANS WAKE: UNLOCKING
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traditions.'68  More narrowly, there might also be great works, the basic
message of which was predictably not grasped, with any precision, by most
or all of its initial audience.169 Some works are ahead of their time, even as
to received meaning. And we certainly might want to consider some coded
messages to be speech, even though the coded message by itself is
unintelligible, at least for its unintended audiences.170 More generally, our
various levels of useful free speech theory shed as much critical light on the
Supreme Court cases as the latter do on our theories of speech.
X. TESTING THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS
The primary lesson to be drawn from the above Supreme Court cases on
the scope of speech is to adopt the best (i.e., the most value-sensitive for free
speech purposes) tests and formulas that we can. But even then, courts
should remain sensitive to context and circumstance. Courts should not
intellectualize or romanticize the actual context, as in a number of the nude
dancing and sex show cases,"' nor be insensitive to context in ways that
miss the point of distinctive forms of speech.172
JAMES JOYCE'S MASTERWORK (Edmund L. Epstein ed., 2005) (tracing the structure of Joyce's
manuscript six decades after the work's initial publication).
167. See, e.g., ST. THERESA OF AVILA, THE INTERIOR CASTLE (E. Allison Peers ed. & trans.,
Sheed & Ward 1972) (1577).
168. See, e.g., THE BHAGAVAD GITA (Laurie L. Patton trans., Penguin Classics 2008).
169. Query, for example, whether the legendary, riotous reaction to Igor Stravinsky's musical
composition Rite of Spring at its premiere in 1913 reflected comprehension and rejection, or at least
some element of incomprehension of intended meaning. There is probably a continuum of public
understanding regarding initially disliked works. Toward the more censorious, as opposed to simply
uncomprehending, end of the spectrum would be the initial, official reaction to Italian scientist
Galileo Galilei's scientific work. For a comprehensive documentary account, see THE GALILEO
AFFAIR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Maurice A. Finocchiaro ed. & trans., 1989).
170. See Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)
("Communication does not lose constitutional protection as 'speech' simply because it is expressed
in the language of computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores are written in 'code,'
i.e., symbolic notations not comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet both are covered by the First
Amendment."). In a sense, the difference between an elaborate code and a common language is a
matter of degree, but the social functions and values of the two may differ. On the other hand, an
unbreakable code and a private diary may both be intended ultimately for an audience of only one.
171. See supra notes 155 & 163 and accompanying text. As the Court observed in the
unprotected (clothed) social dancing case of City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989), "[i]t is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for
example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a kernel is
not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 25. For
similar logic applied in the agonizingly closer case of recreational dancing that is also allegedly
lewd, see Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2005).
172. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing Rumsfeld v. FAIR).
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Consider, for example, one court's insensitivity to context as a source of
intended and received meaning in the case of Samuels v. New York State
Department of Health.173 In Samuels, a same-sex couple sought and was
officially refused a New York State marriage license. 174  The plaintiffs
argued that the discriminatory conditions placed on obtaining a marriage
license amounted to a violation of their free speech rights. 75
On the merits, this claim would seem to be unusually broad. Could
every imaginable official rejection of every claim against the state amount to
an unjustified restriction of the free speech rights of the claimant? Or even a
justified restriction of those free speech rights? Would this not amount to
"free speech overload?" In a sense, it is thus not surprising that the court in
Samuels concluded that "[i]t is not readily apparent [that successfully]
obtaining a marriage license is protected First Amendment activity."' 76
The Samuels court nonetheless displayed, in the course of its analysis,
an unfortunate and dangerous insensitivity to variations in context. In
following Stanglin, Samuels reminded us that '"[i]t is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes ... ."n
Quoting O'Brien, the Samuels court stated it "cannot accept the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech."' 178 These
generalizations were apparently thought to cover the case at hand in
Samuels.179
However useful these generalizations may be, they do not invariably
render unnecessary any inquiry into context and circumstance. For our
purposes, we need not explore the differences between the message sent by
the speaker in an unsuccessful quest for a marriage license and that of a
successful quest for a marriage license. Even in the act of unsuccessfully
applying, the speaker in Samuels was not denied the opportunity to send an
intended, and arguably more or less understood, message. Perhaps one
could argue that the applicant's message is somehow different where the
government, apparently speaking on its own in response, denies the marriage
license. However, this would imply that the meaning of the applicant's
initial speech itself was incomplete, unclear, or undetermined until the
government independently reacted, either favorably or unfavorably, to that
speech. 80
173. Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
174. See id. at 146.
175. See id
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (social dancing case)).
178. Samuels, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(draft card-burning case)).
179. See Samuels, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 147 ("Such is the situation here.").
180. For a loose analogy to an even more mysterious process, see, for example, the discussion of
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Either way, courts should recognize the notable difference between an
act of anti-war draft-card burning,'"' or a deeply symbolic, consciously
politically-intended speech by way of applying as a same-sex couple for a
marriage license,182 and a mere random act of social dancing.'83 This is not
to say that social dancing can never, in a distinctive context, rise to the level
of First Amendment speech, protected or unprotected. Imagine, for
example, a conscientious protest against a state that forbids social dancing
on religious grounds.184 Context in these cases can be crucial.
In the same way, application for a marriage license may intentionally
send no coherent message, or only the vaguest message possible. But under
distinctive circumstances and context, and with the right speaker intentions,
applying for a marriage license, successfully or unsuccessfully, may amount
to a clear and well-understood political statement.181 Consider an historic
civil rights analogy: Usually, an attempt to have lunch at a downtown
drugstore lunch counter says very little. Sometimes, however, just such an
act, in its context, is intended, and predictably interpreted, to say a lot-and
of great political importance.' 86
We should thus hesitate to conclude that a certain kind of act cannot
amount to speech without considering the particular context and
circumstances at issue. And we should be equally open to the possibility
that some of what is currently accepted as speech for First Amendment
purposes may actually not qualify, in light of the basic purposes underlying
the Free Speech Clause and a lack of sufficient speaker intent to convey a
minimally particularized message.18 1
It is thus apparently easy to assume that commercially-sold videos
depicting one form or another of the physically violent abuse of animals
the collapse of the wave-function in standard Copenhagen-style interpretations of quantum
mechanics, supra note 165.
181. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
182. Samuels, 811 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
183. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
184. See, e.g., Michael Zuckerman, Book Review, 27 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 705, 707
(1997) (reviewing BRUCE C. DANIELS, PURITANS AT PLAY: LEISURE AND RECREATION IN COLONIAL
NEW ENGLAND (1995)).
185. Compare the application of a marriage license by a same-sex couple with Gandhi's Salt
March to Dandi, Gujarat, in order to symbolically counter the British salt tax. See, e.g., Gandhi, Salt
and Freedom, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1999, http://www.economist.com/world/asial
displaystory.cfm?story id=347107.
186. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The
Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 645, 660
(1995); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 245-47 (1963).
187. See supra notes 155 & 163 and accompanying text.
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amount to speech for First Amendment purposes, 188 with the sole question
being the degree of First Amendment protection to be accorded the animal
cruelty speech at issue."'9 But before leaping to the debate on whether sales
restrictions of videos depicting the violent physical abuse of animals
constitutes a content-based restriction of speech that can pass a strict
scrutiny test,190 some attention is due our preliminary question. Perhaps we
may wish to set aside any requirement, as in Johnson,'9' of an intended,
particularized message, which Hurley'9 2 and Morse'93  both seem to
recommend. Perhaps we may want to classify the animal abuse videos in
question as a form of entertainment for a narrow, well-defined audience, and
on that basis alone qualify them as speech. 194
But it would hardly be amiss to wonder whether commercial animal
abuse videos invariably embody sufficient speaker intent to convey anything
that resembles a particularized message, and whether restrictions on such
videos represent official disagreement with any such message. Do states
that regulate animal cruelty videos ever show the slightest interest in
attempting to suppress oral or written speech that abstractly advocates
animal cruelty or its decriminalization? Is the degree of linkage between
animal cruelty videos and any of the basic free speech values ever explicitly
articulated? 95 Are the animal cruelty videos that count as speech more
articulate than the instances of allegedly lewd dancing that do not?l96
188. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 129
S. Ct. 1984 (2009).
189. See id. (applying a rigorous strict scrutiny approach to the speech regulation in question).
190. See id. at 232, 236 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (focusing primarily on the existence of a
compelling governmental interest in restricting such speech).
191. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (en
banc), cert granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2331222 at *9 and *9 n.6
(suggesting possible, particularized messages in animal cruelty videos, including the potential
violence of pit bulls, the legality of dog fighting, and "the significance of human bloodthirst[] and
broader themes concerning animalistic conflict and conquest").
192. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("[e]ntertainment, as
well as political and ideological speech, is protected .... .").
195. Probably the best, general argument for classifying animal abuse videos as speech would be
that such videos may aim at "the transformation of taste." See Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251
(7th Cir. 1990) (discussing the classification of "casual chit-chat"). But we might want to find such
a standard over-inclusive, lest any and every "fashion statement" then becomes a free speech
statement. See infra notes 209-28 and accompanying text. Nor is it clear, in advance of the
evidence, that all distributors, even commercial distributors, of such videos consciously intend, in
the act of selling such videos, to communicate such a message. Often, a sale may accommodate a
pre-existing (individual) taste, without also proselytizing on behalf of any broader systematic change
in cultural tastes.
196. See Willis v. Town of Marshall, 426 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Whether all commercial animal abuse videos should qualify as speech for
constitutional purposes is actually more doubtful than is often assumed.
XI. MUST WE GIVE IN TO "MODERATE PESSIMISM" IN DISTINGUISHING
"SPEECH" FROM "NON-SPEECH"?
It is understandable that some observers have, in light of all the
difficulties noted above, adopted a "moderate pessimism" regarding the
ability to distinguish speech from non-speech for constitutional purposes. It
has thus been argued that "[s]ome expressive conduct is treated as speech,
and some as just conduct, but there is no easy way to tell them apart."l97
More particularly, and perhaps more strongly, "it is incredibly difficult to
define why some expressive conduct is speech and why other expressive
conduct is not; why ignoring the red light is not speech but marching down
the middle of the street may be."' 98
In response to such pessimistic concerns, much can be said. We start by
noting that most instances of red light-running do not involve an intention on
the part of the driver to convey a particularized message under Johnson,199 or
even a more diffuse message under Hurley200 or Morse,201 to any audience
with which the driver is genuinely concerned. In contrast, at least some
diffuse message was presumably intended to be conveyed to the targeted St.
Patrick's Day parade onlookers in Hurley.202
Beyond this, we can point to the helpful roles of both social convention
and sheer pragmatism. While remaining sensitive to particular contexts and
circumstances, convention and pragmatism suggest the value of
presumptions and of a relatively general rule. Thus, we normally classify
the impulsive, unauthorized, minimally-publicized, and generally audience-
indifferent running of a red light as non-speech. For most red light-runners,
having no audience is the ideal. By contrast, most traditional, annual
parades running along traditionally-sanctioned parade routes, whether
thematically-based on a holiday or not, are reasonably classified as speech.
Similarly, non-traditional, occasion-based parades that float down suitable
197. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message From Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2008).
198. Id.
199. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 145-50 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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streets, which are intended to attract an audience and convey some evident
general message, are also reasonably classified as speech.
These classifications typically make sense at the level of established
social convention, and the bounds thereof. But more crucially, the above
classifications also make pragmatic sense. The typical red light-runner
threatens carnage, typically offers little in the way of an intended message,
seeks no comprehending audience, and is not distinctively promoting any of
the basic free speech values.203 Whatever interesting message the typical red
light-runner might intend to convey-perhaps "I am in a hurry, or else
impatient and irresponsible"-could often be conveyed just as clearly, to an
intended audience, through some alternative means or channel of speech.20
Just driving through a red light may not count as a useful warning of some
independent danger. Any possible message like "I am now a serious menace
to those around me" largely and pointlessly reproduces the act of dangerous
driving itself. The question posed above,205 that of whether such a
borderline "speaker" could, at low cost, have made his status as a speaker
substantially clearer, may also be relevant.
A more difficult case of red light-running might involve an
ideologically-motivated suicide bomber, or perhaps a conscientious speeder
on some important emergency mission, with the latter using his or her car
horn to communicate a message of warning. One possible judicial response
would be to assume that because cases of genuine speech through red light-
running will be so rare, it would not be socially beneficial, all things
considered, to recognize such a category. Alternatively, courts could
explore the specific context and circumstances surrounding the red light-
running cases, and declare any particular instance to either involve speech or
not. As we have seen, it is generally important to reach and decide the
question of speech or non-speech when the case genuinely presents such an
issue.206  But even the most interesting red light-running cases will not
typically involve any such legal issue. Emergency ambulances often run
through red lights, and that action may or may not be legally justified, but
the ambulance driver's decision is typically independent of whether we
believe the ambulance driver to have been a First Amendment speaker or
not. All told, there are thus reasonable and constructive responses to the
case for moderate pessimism regarding speech.
203. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
204. For discussion of the importance of alternative speech channels, see R. George Wright, The
Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech
Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57 (1989).
205. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
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XII. Is ABANDONING THE ATTEMPT TO DISTINGUISH "SPEECH" FROM
"NON-SPEECH" JUSTIFIED?: A MODESTLY OPTIMISTIC RESPONSE TO
STRONG LIBERTARIAN PESSIMISM
We should not succumb to the "moderate pessimism" approach 20 7 to the
problem of distinguishing speech from non-speech. But what can be said in
response to an apparently more radical challenge that urges us to simply
abandon the attempt to distinguish between speech and non-speech for First
Amendment purposes? 208 It has recently been argued that "[c]ases thus far
decided ... suggest that no logical lines can reasonably be drawn to separate
speech from nonspeech, content with a message from that without, and
expressive acts from nonexpressive ones."209
We must first acknowledge that our survey has not exhausted all of the
contexts in which the speech versus non-speech distinction arises. Merely
for the sake of additional illustration, we should recognize that the boundary
between speech and non-speech has also been debated in connection with
such matters as school clothing, 210 as well as in regard to clothing in other
contexts.211
Not surprisingly, clothing-as-possible-speech questions commonly turn
out to be highly contextual. One might consider a general proposition that
school clothing is normally not First Amendment speech, however
expressive of one's self-identity, one's feelings, or of some diffuse self-
centered message the clothing may be.212 It has thus been said that "[s]elf-
expression is not to be equated to the expression of ideas or opinions and
thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace." 213 On the other hand,
some forms of clothing in particular contexts can be intended, and thus are
likely to broadly, successfully, convey a reasonably-particularized political
message.214 Even specific colors can be clearly identified, in context, with
particular social or political messages.215 Thus clothing "may ... symbolize
207. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
208. See Daniel F. Wachtell, No Harm, No Foul: Reconceptualizing Free Speech Via Tort Law,
83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 949, 949-50 (2008).
209. Id. at 950.
210. See, e.g., Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 480 F.3d 460, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2007);
Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 440-41 (5th Cir. 2001).
211. See, e.g., Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 319, 320 (2d Cir. 2003).
212. See Brandt, 480 F.3d at 465 (citing Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 389
(6th Cir. 2005)).
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Beyond the familiar, affiliated gang colors, of course, we might think of the Burmese
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ethnic heritage, religious beliefs, and political and social views," 2 16 at one
level of clarity and particularity or another.2 17 Even in close cases regarding
clothing-as-possible-speech, courts may attempt to somehow reconcile the
tensions between Johnson's requirement of an intended and likely
understood particularized message2 18 and Hurley's disavowal of any need for
"a narrow, succinctly articulable message."219
In the clothing cases, courts sometimes reach questionable results by
confusing the abstractness or generality of a message with the very different
idea of vagueness. 220  A "clothing statement" that is broad, abstract, or
general need not also be so vague as to disqualify the expression from the
category of speech.221 Thus, a "broad statement of cultural values" 222 or a
"comprehensive view of life and society"223 need not be disqualified as
speech, as long as there is sufficient intention and, where necessary,224 a
probable understanding of the broad message in question. Indeed, some of
the most valuable political statements take the form of broad, general
statements. If a contextually-political act of flag burning is not invariably
too vague to qualify as speech,225 then a Buddhist monk's act of wearing
robes could also, in some contexts, intentionally convey a broad or
comprehensive view of life without being too vague to qualify as speech.226
"Yellow Revolution" movement, or the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" movement. See, e.g.,
Telegraph.co.uk, Harry D. Quetteville, Bangkok Airport Storming Sells Thai People Short, Nov. 26,
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3563779/Bangkok-airport-storming-sells-
Thai-people-short.html.
216. Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2001).
217. See, e.g., Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 319, 319-20 (2d Cir. 2003).
218. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
219. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
220. See supra notes 111-36 and accompanying text.
221. For an intriguing case, see Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 319-20 (citing E. Hartford Educ. Ass'n. v.
Bd. of Educ. of E. Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1977)). Certainly a classic work of
political theory, like Hobbes's Leviathan, can be broad, general, and abstract without being unduly
vague.
222. Id. at 319 (finding excessive vagueness).
223. Id. at 320 (quoting East Hartford, 562 F.2d at 857 (finding excessive vagueness)).
224. For example, setting aside the kinds of cases discussed, supra notes 166-74 and
accompanying text, there are other cases in which, intentionally or even unintentionally, a complex
or controversial message is predictably "over the heads" of, and not understood by, most or all the
immediate audience.
225. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974).
226. Similar sorts of debates over the required kind and degree of "expressiveness" recur in
related contexts, including that of various kinds and contexts of jewelry. See, e.g., Grzywna ex rel.
Doe v. Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (middle school
student's patriotic red, white, and blue necklace sufficiently particularly communicative and likely
understood by audience to qualify as speech). Posture can, in context, be expressive, as in the case
of showing respect, reverence, or enthusiasm. But see, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300,
303 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs sitting on sidewalk held insufficiently communicative). Hair style is
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As we move away from the clothing-related cases, however, the
problem of determining the bounds of First Amendment speech takes on
somewhat different forms. In some cases, for example, those of aggravated
criminal harassment via the telephone,227 there may be grounds for
concluding that such harassment does not count as speech in the
constitutional sense. It is sometimes said that "[h]arassment is not
communication, although it may take the form of speech." 228 Thus, it is fair
to imagine that much telephone harassment falls far short of, say, either an
attempt at meaningful dialogue or anything like a scathing critique of
Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex.229
Some instances of gender-based harassment in the workplace under
Title VII may be similarly analyzed.230 It is imaginable that some instances
of workplace harassment could amount to explicitly ideological speech,
meeting even the most rigorous interpretations of the Johnson two-part test
for speech.231 The untidy fact that some workplace harassment amounts to
generally not seen as expressive. See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1972)
("[W]e think it doubtful that the wearing of long hair has sufficient communicative content to entitle
it to the protection of the First Amendment") (without referring to cultural context of Vietnam War-
era protest symbolism, but noting plaintiffs professed lack of political message). Tattooing poses an
interesting question of expression for First Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Hold Fast Tattoo, LLC
v. City of N. Chi., 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659-60 (N.D. 111. 2008) ("[t]he act of tattooing.. . is not
intended to convey a particularized message" and is therefore not speech for First Amendment
purposes). The court in Hold Fast Tattoo appeared to concede that the bearer of a visible tattoo may
well intend to convey an adequate such message. See id. at 660. Consider the tattoo equivalent of
the protected anti-draft message lettered on a jacket in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). But
the Hold Fast Tattoo court appeared to assume, along with a number of other courts, that the tattoo
artist, regardless of the scope of available discretion as to the particular message conveyed, will not
count as a speaker for First Amendment purposes. See Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 660 n..
Surely the status of being an artist with a more or less specific commission cannot always preclude
the commissioned artist from also being a speaker, perhaps along with the commissioning party. For
an extreme case relating to the issue of commissioned-artist-as-speaker, see generally IRVING
STONE, THE AGONY AND THE EcsTASY: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOVEL OF MICHELANGELO (1961)
(Michelangelo, Pope Julius II, and the painting of the Sistine Chapel ceiling).
227. State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
228. Id. at 112 (quoting Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988)); see also supra note
62 (example of the "Blaring Car Horn").
229. See generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage
Books 1989) (1949).
230. See the general, analytical scheme set forth in Baty v. Willamette Industries, 172 F.3d 1232,
1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534-36
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (raising the possibility of discriminatory conduct as distinct from speech)). See
also Doe v. City of New York, 583 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448-49 & 448 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
231. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
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speech and some does not underlies the extensive debates over the proper
232role of free speech analysis in Title VII sexual harassment cases.
These and other 233 complications should not, however, lead us to the
apparently radical course of seeking to abandon the general distinction
between speech and non-speech for free speech purposes.234 It may be
tempting to conclude that there is nothing distinctive about speech in its core
uses, and that the basic reasons for protecting freedom of speech 235 should
lead us to a constitutionally mandated libertarianism of speech and
conduct,236 with no need to differentiate between the two. The idea would
be that speech-as-conduct should generally be constitutionally protected.237
The exceptions to such general libertarian protection would focus primarily
on preventing or punishing "intrusions upon bodily integrity or economic
232. For a mere sampling of some of the broader literature regarding workplace harassment and
the First Amendment, see Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 815
(1996); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT.
REv. 1; Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 563
(1995). Of course, even to the extent that workplace harassment may sometimes involve speech,
civil rights considerations may validate the application of Title VII remedies in such cases. See the
discussions in the cases cited supra note 230.
233. For a sampling of additional problematic categories, see the case discussions of begging and
panhandling in Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Whether with or without words, the object of begging and panhandling is the transfer of money.
Speech simply is not inherent to the act; it is not of the essence of the conduct."), and the more
accommodating Loper v. New York City Police Department, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We
see little difference between those who solicit for organized charities and those who solicit for
themselves in regard to the message conveyed."). For examples of work solicitation by day laborers,
see Lopez v. Town of Cave Creek, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1031 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("'It is beyond
dispute that solicitation is a form of expression entitled to the same constitutional protections as
traditional speech' .... ) (quoting ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 792 (9th Cir.
2006)). Examples of illegal commercial solicitation include United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct.
1830, 1841-42 (2008) ("offers to give or receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social value
and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection") (but presumably an offer to sell a
stolen political bumper sticker could count as political speech, however, subject to regulation). For
an example of printed store receipts with the expiration date of the purchaser's own credit card, see
Cicilline v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("Given the
information conveyed by the receipts, each receipt constitutes a deliberate-albeit dry-
communication . .. and therefore constitutes 'speech' within the contours of the First Amendment.")
(despite the fact that the "audience" already knows, and hardly needs confirmation or reinforcement
of, the expiration date of their own credit card). See also Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2782
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing J. Skelly Wright, Politics and
the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
250-51 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the relationship
between the expenditure of money to finance speech and speech itself), overruled by Citizens United
v. FEC 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
234. See Wachtell, supra note 208 at 950.
235. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
236. See Wachtell, supra note 208, at 950-51.
237. See id. at 950.
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interests,"238 as opposed to a number of subjective, abstract, psychic, or
intangible harms.239 An after-work nip of brandy, or avoiding a seat belt or
motorcycle helmet, would then become matters of the First Amendment.
There are some areas of free speech law where such a proposal may
seem less like a radical reform and more like a mere reflection of established
law. Part of the underlying but unexpressed motivation for declaring
commercial nude dancing to be speech240 may be a dislike of government
repressiveness regarding sex or nudity in general. Thus, in some limited
respects, a proposal to abandon the speech versus non-speech distinction
may not depart much from the status quo.
In fact, there may be a number of cases the analysis and resolution of
which might not differ much whether we adopted a standard "basic free
speech value" analysis or an analysis in terms of a new constitutionally-
protected, broad conduct libertarianism. Consider, for example, a case of
cross burning241 or some other form of hate speech242 on both approaches.
Could not both approaches take into account the same considerations at the
same weight, including property rights, expressiveness, reasonable fears,
intimidation and coercion, and the intentional infliction of emotional
distress? If not, is it clear that a libertarian emphasis on mostly tangible
harms and economic interests at the expense of some "psychic" injuries or
"offenses" will typically be superior in the hate speech context?
There is a deeper problem with regard to any proposed abandonment of
the speech versus non speech distinction in favor of any sort of broader
libertarianism. Defining the boundaries of what should rightly be protected
under libertarianism has already proven to be no more easily managed than
the problems of defining the boundaries of speech. We cannot explore here
the deep and endless controversies over how to formulate, clarify, defend, or
modify John Stuart Mill's "Harm Principle."24 3 But by abandoning the
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding the general principle of
prohibiting cross burning done with the intent to intimidate).
242. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999) (upholding an
injunction against the use of racial epithets in the workplace even when the targeted employees were
not in a position to hear them).
243. See MILL, supra note 68, at 29, 68, and Professor Himmelfarb's Introduction thereto. See
also Joel Feinberg, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984); JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003); J.S. MILL ON LIBERTY:
IN Focus (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991); LIMITS OF LIBERTY: STUDIES OF MILL's ON
LIBERTY (Peter Radcliff ed., 1966); JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE (2d ed. 1996);
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search for the proper bounds of speech in favor of anything like the best
libertarian harm principle, we do not trade murkiness for clarity, relevance,
and ready consensus.244 All things considered, the more radical case for
attempting to abandon the speech versus non-speech distinction thus seems
unpromising.
XIII. CONCLUSION
As anticipated,245 we have arrived at an untidy solution: properly setting
the bounds of what should count as speech for First Amendment purposes is
a judicially246  and theoretically2 47  inescapable task of unavoidable
complexity. A number of interrelated factors, operating at varying levels of
specificity, must all be given their due. To this end, we have identified and
discussed above the proper role of a number of layered but interactive
approaches in sorting out speech from non-speech.
Thus, we drew upon the relevant constitutional text and any available
original constitutional meaning248 of speech in the First Amendment sense.
We considered the substantial value, as well as some limitations, of
Professor Schauer's functionalist approach2 4 9 to the scope of speech. We
then took into account the categories of symbolism and pre-symbolism in
specifically-constitutional speech.250 The temptation to judicially bypass the
complex task of defining speech was considered but firmly rejected on
substantive grounds.251
Substantial guidance was instead drawn from referring to the
fundamental values normally thought to underlie our constitutional
protection of speech in the first place.252 But we recognized that courts
rightly do not adjudicate cases by direct and immediate reference to the
DAVID LYONS, RIGHTS, WELFARE, AND MILL'S MORAL THEORY 89-108 (1994); JEREMY
WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 115-33 (1993).
244. There is, for example, no entirely neutral, short-cut, consensus solution under a harm
principle approach to the problem of a religious believer who claims that being forced to tolerate
public blasphemies will result not merely in his or her being offended, but in generally undesirable
long-term indirect social harms, or in divinely ordained plagues and disasters, or even in his or her
own eternal post-mortem torment for tolerating blasphemies by others.
245. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
246. One cannot judicially bypass the problem by merely assuming for the sake of argument that
nearly everything counts as speech and then fairly adjudicating the case from there. See supra notes
56-74 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 197-11 and accompanying text (discussing the proper response to "moderate
pessimism" toward our inquiry). See also supra notes 208-50 (discussing various responses to a
more literally radical pessimism or an apparently dramatic reformulation of the issue).
248. See supra Part II.
249. See supra Part III.
250. See supra Part IV.
251. See supra Part V.
252. See supra Part VI.
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fundamental free speech values. Courts should instead invoke different
levels and degrees of specificity in their analysis, in interactive and mutually
complementary ways. Thus, we explored the usefulness of not just the
fundamental free speech values, but also of general rules that might shed
light on the scope of speech, of mid-level heuristic devices, and of attending
to specific context and circumstance.253 Each of these levels of analysis
deserves to be accounted for in a process of "reflective equilibrium."254
With these interactive approaches constituting the core of our legal analysis,
we then sought to draw upon any relevant supplementary insights from the
general literary theory of meaning255 and in particular from the literary
theory of ambiguity and vagueness.256
With our basic theoretical apparatus in place, we considered the
elements of synthesis, tension, and uncertainty in the leading Supreme Court
opinions on the scope of speech.257 We subjected the Court's results to
critique, through our theoretical apparatus, in the context of the further
judicial application of the Court's own precedents.258 Our results cast doubt
on the clarity, persuasiveness, and straightforward applicability of crucial
Supreme Court precedents.
We then rounded out the analysis by responding to both a moderately
pessimistic and an at least apparently more dramatically pessimistic259
approach to the complex task of distinguishing speech from non-speech for
constitutional purposes. Neither form of pessimism, it turned out, was
pragmatically justified in the sense of avoiding difficult problems of
constitutional interpretation or otherwise leaving us better off than before.260
Overall, our approach thus remains multi-faceted and unavoidably
complex. The complexity is the price necessarily paid for the desired
sensitivity to important differences in the forms and contexts of
communication.
For the sake of a convenient summary, we can say that the heart of our
approach involves a shifting, intuitive interaction among the basic purposes
of protecting speech in the first place, useful general rules, what we have
called mid-level heuristics, relevant theory, and more particularized attention
253. See supra Part VI.
254. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part VII.
256. See supra Part VIII.
257. See supra Part IX.
258. See supra Part X.
259. See supra Part XI.
260. See supra Part XII.
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to specific context and circumstance, with none of these components being
absolutely privileged. While our approach remains complex, the vertical
layering of the interactive elements, with their different degrees of
specificity, allows for a visualization of the major considerations.
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